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Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role of Employer Motive 
in Corporate Transformations 
For over fifty years, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or · 
Act)1 has provided employees2 with the statutory right to choose an 
exclusive bargaining representative3 (i.e., a labor union) with whom 
their employer must bargain collectively. 4 The goal of the bargaining 
process is a collective bargaining contract agreed to by both the union 
and the employer. 5 Unfortunately, some employers attempt to dis-
avow their bargaining obligations and valid labor contracts following, 
or through, a change in corporate form. 
The most blatant disavowal of NLRA responsibilities involves an 
employer motivated by anti-union animus. 6 One example of evasion 
has been described as follows: 
The United Auto Workers ... caustically refers to it as "manage-
ment's neutron bomb - you eliminate the union workforce, but keep the 
business intact." 
"It" involves a union shop's owners locking the doors, only to move 
1. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982)). 
See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 79-94 
(10th ed. 1986) (describing the origins and development of the NLRA). 
2. Large segments of the work force are not covered by the NLRA. For example, public 
employees are exempt from the Act, as are those employed in the agricultural sector. See NLRA 
§§ 2(2), (3), 29 u.s.c. §§ 152(2), (3) (1982). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, 
supra note 1, at 95-104 (discussing scope of National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction). 
3. This right is stated in NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), which provides in pertinent 
part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection 
.•.. " (emphasis added). 
4. This obligation is imposed by NLRA §§ 8(a)(5) & 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & 159(a) 
(1982). Section 8(a)(5) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions 
of section 9(a)." Section 9(a) in turn provides that 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the ma-
jority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 
5. The obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal 
or require the making of a concession." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See H.K. 
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970): 
One of the[] fundamental policies [of the NLRA] is freedom of contract •.•• [A]llowing the 
Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate 
the fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining under govemmen· 
tal supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms 
of the contract. 
See also NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 282 (1972) (quoting NLRA § 8(d)). 
6. "Anti-union animus" is a broader term than mere "personal dislike" and encompasses all 
negative labor-related motives (e.g., an employer's desire to escape high labor costs). See note 83 
infra. 
1024 
April 1988] Note - Alter Ego Doctrine 1025 
across the street or across the state and reopen a short time later under a 
non-union umbrella. In what's commonly referred to as an alter-ego 
transaction, only the names of the company and the workforce change.7 
An employer cannot, however, evade its responsibilities in such a bla-
tant manner. 8 In the "neutron bomb" case described above, a union 
will generally file unfair labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(l), 
(3), and (5) of the Act.9 
In considering such charges, the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB" or "Board") applies a test known as the "alter ego doc-
trine" - an inquiry into whether the "new" (successor) employer is in 
fact the same as the "old" (predecessor) employer. An alter ego em-
ployer's refusal to bargain with the predecessor's union will at a mini-
mum constitute an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(5)10 and 
8(a)(l).11 Additionally, an alter ego employer that discriminatorily 
fires its workforce commits an unfair labor practice under section 
8(a)(3). 12 
The United States Supreme Court established the alter ego doc-
trine over forty years ago in Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB. 13 The 
test seeks to determine "[w]hether there was a bona fide discontinu-
ance and a true change of ownership ... or merely a disguised contin-
7. Engel, Name Game: Union-Busting or Good Business?, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 18, 1983, 
at 19. 
8. See Parts I.B and II infra. 
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (3), & (5) (1982). 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See note 4 supra. 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1982). The§ 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice gives rise to a derivative 
violation of§ 8(a)(l). Section 8(a)(l) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section ,7 ." 
Because actions described in subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) constitute interference with an 
employee's § 7 rights, a violation of any of these subsections has been held to be a derivative 
violation of§ 8(a)(l). See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note l, at 114. Thus, a com-
plaint alleging alter ego status will always contain a derivative § 8(a)(l) charge, even though the 
focus is on a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain. 
12. In a "neutron bomb" case, see text at note 7 supra, the firing of the work force usually 
involves employer discrimination. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), prohibits any 
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." While many employ-
ers changing their corporate form do, in fact, attempt to fire some or all of their work force, in 
many instances the employer attempts to keep the work force, and merely shed itself of the 
union; thus, while § 8(a)(3) may be implicated in an alter ego case, not all such cases violate the 
section. Compare NLRB v. McAllister Bros., 819 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 1987) ("new" em-
ployer "did not offer jobs to fifteen of [its predecessor's] Union employees"), and NLRB v. Bell 
Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting a Board finding that discharge of employees 
was discriminatorily motivated), with NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 578 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (involving only a § 8(a)(5) violation for "repudiating the collective bargaining agree-
ment"), and Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen Local 576 v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 223 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (same). In contrast, almost all alter ego cases involve at a minimum a§ 8(a)(5) 
charge because the employer is, by definition, repudiating the collective bargaining contract 
based on its claim of being a "new" employer, regardless of whether it retains the predecessor's 
work force. But see Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983) (involving only§§ 8(a)(l) & 
(3) charges). 
13. 315 U.S. 100 (1942). 
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uance of the old employer."14 An employer cannot escape liability 
"[i]f there was merely a change in name."15 A subsequent employer 
found to be the alter ego of its predecessor is not only bound to bar-
gain with its predecessor's union, but is held to the terms of the prior 
collective bargaining agreement itself. 16 
Although the alter ego doctrine is well-settled in cases where an 
employer's change in corporate form is motivated by anti-union ani-
mus or an intent to evade its collective bargaining obligations, corpo-
rate transformations also occur for reasons unrelated to animus. The 
Supreme Court's Southport decision did not address the appropriate 
role of employer motive in such cases. The courts of appeals are di-
vided on the proper role of motive, and no clear majority favors any 
particular standard.17 There are, however, three primary approaches 
to reviewing NLRB alter ego findings. 
Some courts argue that animus is "critical"; the court will not en-
force an NLRB alter ego order if the Board has not first found an 
"intent to evade."18 A second approach contends that animus is 
merely "relevant": "[A] finding of employer intent is not essential or 
prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one 
of the relevant factors which the Board can consider, along with the 
well-established factors of substantial identity of management, busi-
ness purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision and own-
ership .... " 19 A third approach, espoused by the Fourth Circuit, 
finds an alter ego relationship only if (1) the same entity controls the 
old and new employer; and (2) the employer anticipated a "reasonably 
foreseeable benefit . . . related to the elimination of its labor obliga-
tions."20 The Fourth Circuit based its standard on an analysis of Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.21 The NLRB 
itself has not taken a clear position on the appropriate standard, with 
some members arguing that animus is "relevant, but not prerequisite" 
to imposing alter ego status, while other members imply that it is 
"critical."22 The division among the courts of appeals and the Board is 
not without practical significance. The increasing number of alter ego 
cases during the past fifteen years underscores the need for a uniform 
14. 315 U.S. at 106. 
15. 315 U.S. at 106. 
16. See text at note 70 infra. 
17. See Part II infra. 
18. See Part II.A infra. 
19. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see 
Part 11.B infra. The "well-established" factors referred to by the Sixth Circuit were formulated 
by the NLRB in Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976). The Board continues to 
apply these factors, which are accepted by all of the federal courts of appeals. See Part I.B.2 
infra. 
20. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983); see Part 11.C infra. 
21. 380 U.S. 263 (1965); see Part 11.C infra. 
22. See notes 82, 90 & text at 133 infra. 
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standard. 23 
This Note examines the differing judicial approaches for reviewing 
NLRB alter ego findings, and concludes that a fundamental problem 
with all of the current approaches is the unwarranted consideration of 
motive in varying degrees. This Note proposes a modified "reasonably 
foreseeable benefit" standard which does not depend in any degree on 
the employer's motive for changing its corporate form. Part I dis-
cusses the origin and evolution of the alter ego doctrine, including its 
genesis in Southport Petroleum, the well-settled Crawford Door factors, 
and the related "successorship" doctrine. Part II analyzes the conflict 
among the federal courts of appeals over the role of employer motive 
and Supreme Court cases in related areas of labor law. This part 
maintains that the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" 
standard provides an excellent foundation for the appropriate stan-
dard, and proposes a modified approach in which (1) the Board ap-
plies the flexible, seven-factor Crawford Door test; and (2) if it finds 
that the "new" employer is in reality the same as its predecessor, the 
Board must then inquire whether the old employer anticipated a "rea-
sonably foreseeable benefit" for any reason. Alter ego status is found 
only if both prongs of the test are met.24 
Part III examines the policy considerations attendant to accommo-
dating the tension between legitimate employee expectations and an 
employer's freedom to rearrange its business - and to go out of busi-
ness - as it sees fit. The modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" 
standard proposed in Part II properly defines the bounds of both legit-
23. Over the course of a 25-year career with the NLRB (1962-1987), Elliott Moore had an 
opportunity to observe the progression of alter ego cases. His general impression about trends in 
the number of such cases is of their infrequent occurrence during the 1960s and early 1970s, and 
of increasing activity (and importance) during the past fifteen years. Telephone interview with 
Elliott Moore, former Deputy Associate General Counsel of the NLRB (Mar. 29, 1988). Statis-
tics kept by the NLRB beginning in 1970 bear out Mr. Moore's impressions. From 1970 through 
1974, only four alter ego cases were adjudicated at any level (AU, NLRB, and federal courts). 
CLASSIFIED INDEX OF NLRB DECISIONS & RELATED COURT DECISIONS 375-76 (Employer 
Obligation to Bargain,§ 520(4850 3300)) (June 1974) [hereinafter CLASSIFIED INDEX] (covering 
decisions issued from July 1970 through June 1974). There were 23 cases during the remainder 
of the decade. CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 347 (Dec. 1976)) (covering July 1974 through Dec. 
1976) and CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 632-33 (Dec. 1979) (covering Jan. 1977 through Dec. 
1979). During the 1980s, there have been 35 cases to date. CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 686 
(Dec. 1982) (covering Jan. 1980 through Dec. 1982), CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 352-53 (Dec. 
1984) (covering Jan. 1982 through Dec. 1984), CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 373-74 (Dec. 1986) 
(covering Jan. 1985 through Dec. 1986), and CLASSIFIED INDEX, supra, at 121 (June 1987) (cov-
ering Jan. 1987 through June 1987). In addition, these statistics do not include the large number 
of settled cases that never reach trial. For example, from October 1985 through September 1987, 
approximately 92% of all cases in which the General Counsel issued a complaint were settled. 
NLRB Internal Memorandum GC-88-3, Summary of Operations for Fiscal Year 1987, at 3 
(Mar. 9, 1988) (Copy on file with Michigan Law Review). A slightly lower settlement rate of 
85% is used as a rule of thumb for any given year. Telephone interview with James Y. Callear, 
FOIA Officer, NLRB Legal Research & Policy Planning Branch, Division of Advice, Office of 
the General Counsel (Mar. 30, 1988). These percentages do not include cases that were settled 
prior to the issuance of a complaint. Id. 
24. See Part 11.C infra. 
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imate employee expectations and employer freedom. Predictability 
and uniformity are achieved in NLRB decisions without an undue sac-
rifice in the Board's ability to apply flexibly the Crawford Door factors. 
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE 
A. Congress's Broad Brush: The NLRA 
The legislative history, and the language of the NLRA itself, state 
Congress's two broad labor-law objectives - "to promote industrial 
peace and equality of bargaining power."25 The way in which Con-
gress sought to accomplish this goal was through "removing certain 
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest."26 Two of the 
NLRA provisions designed for this purpose are applicable to this 
Note.27 First, section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain collec-
tively with the representative of its employees.28 Second, section 
8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination in hiring, tenure, or terms and condi-
tions of employment which encourage or discourage union member-
ship. 29 However, neither the legislative history nor the language of the 
Act addresses the problem of an employer changing its corporate form 
and potentially escaping from the predecessor employer's NLRA 
obligations. 
Recognizing the impossibility of fashioning a comprehensive set of 
rules and regulations, Congress gave the NLRB a mandate to carry 
out its national labor policies and objectives. 30 The Board thus has 
primary responsibility for deciding whether an unfair labor practice 
25. S. REP. No. 573, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) 
(statement of findings and policies); see, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 454 (1957); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 45 (1937). 
26. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). 
27. A violation of either of these sections also triggers a violation of § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(l) (1982). See note 11 supra. 
28. See note 4 supra. In addition, NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), defines the 
phrase "to bargain collectively," providing in pertinent part: 
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and 
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .•.• [W]here there 
is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees ... the duty to bargain col· 
lectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such 
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification [meets specified terms, 
such as a 60-day written-notice period]. The duties imposed ... shall become inapplicable 
. . . [if] the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been 
superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees ...• 
In an alter ego case, the "new" employer not only terminates the contract, but refuses to bargain 
with the union altogether, arguing that the union has "ceased to be the representative of the 
employees." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). If the "new" employer is found to be an 
alter ego, however, it has failed to bargain collectively as defined in § 8(d), and hence violates 
§ 8(a)(5). See also text at note 115 infra. 
29. See note 12 supra. 
30. NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), provides in pertinent part: "The Board shall have 
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 
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violation has occurred under section 8.31 A reviewing court must ac-
cept "the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if 
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 
whole."32 Because alter ego determinations have been held to be ques-
tions of fact, 33 the NLRB's findings are entitled to judicial deference, 
although such deference does not leave the courts without a significant 
role in this area. 34 This role, and the interplay of the NLRB and the 
courts, is the subject of the next section. 
B. Filling in the Details: The NLRB and the Courts 
1. Genesis: Southport Petroleum 
The alter ego doctrine originated in the early 1940s with the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Southport Petroleum Co. v. 
NLRB.35 Given that the lower courts and the NLRB put great weight 
on the language of the Court's holding, 36 and that Southport was the 
first and last pronouncement of the Court on this subject, 37 an in-
depth review of both the facts and the holding of the case is important. 
This subpart will show that the language of Southport does not sup-
port an intent requirement beyond those cases in which an employer 
clearly intends to evade its bargaining obligations. 
Southport Petroleum was a Texas corporation that had engaged in 
various unfair labor practices. 38 The Board found violations of sec-
31. As noted earlier, the key provision with respect to the alter ego doctrine is NLRA 
§ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See note 12 supra. 
32. NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). The courts must defer to the Board's exper-
tise where its findings are supported by substantial evidence, even though the reviewing court 
could "justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The primary justification for this deference is 
that the Board is "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal 
with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an 
expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." 340 U.S. at 488; see also 
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979). 
33. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942) ("Whether there was a 
bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership· ... is a question of fact."); see also 
Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 
F.2d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984). 
34. The characterization of an alter ego finding as a "question of fact" does not mean that the 
courts of appeals have no role to play in the doctrine. The current division among the courts as 
to the appropriate legal standard the Board must apply in making its/actual determination, see 
Part II infra, before enforcement will be granted makes clear that this is actually a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. 
35. 315 U.S. 100 (1942). 
36. See Part II infra. 
37. The Supreme Court does, however, discuss the alter ego doctrine as dicta in a related 
successorship doctrine case. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Ho-
tel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974). The Court's alter ego footnote is 
discussed in Part l.C infra. 
38. Southport, 315 U.S. at 101, 102. The primary violation was the discriminatory discharge 
of "three employees at [Southport's] Texas City, Texas, oil refinery because of their membership 
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tions 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(l),39 and ordered Southport to cease and desist 
from these practices.40 Approximately ten months after the Board's 
order, Southport "entered into a written stipulation ... that it would 
obey the order."41 Only three days later, Southport "distributed all of 
its assets to its four stockholders as a liquidating dividend; and [the 
stockholders] conveyed it to a newly organized Delaware corpora-
tion."42 The shareholders then claimed that, because the predecessor 
company had been dissolved, the Board's remedial order was invalid.43 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's order on a narrow holding 
based upon Texas law.44 The Supreme Court's affirmance was based 
on a similarly narrow holding. The sole issue before the Court was 
whether the court of appeals erred in denying Southport's application 
for leave to adduce additional evidence that the Texas company had 
dissolved, and was therefore beyond the reach of the Board's remedial 
order.45 
The Court rejected the shareholders' contention. Speaking for the 
Court, Justice Jackson stated that the appropriate test was "Whether 
there was a bqna fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership 
- which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the 
Board's order - or merely a disguised continuance of the old em-
ployer .... "46 Justice Jackson further noted that Southport's business 
operation "might have continued under the old business form or under 
a disguise intended to evade [the Board's reinstatement] provision. If 
there was merely a change in name or in apparent control there is no 
reason to grant [Southport] relief from the Board's order .... "47 
and activity in (the union] ..•. " Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 3, Southport 
Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942) (No. 67); see also 315 U.S. at 102·03. 
39. The Board did not find a violation of § 8(a)(5) for refusing to bargain with the union; 
rather, it found a violation only for the discriminatory discharge claim. See Southport Petroleum 
Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 792, 806 (1938), enforced, NLRB v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F.2d 90 (5th 
Cir. 1941), affd., 315 U.S. 100 (1942). There is no indication from the facts that the "old" or 
"new" company ever repudiated its collective bargaining contract or duty to bargain with the 
union. Such facts are present in most current alter ego litigation. See note 12 supra. 
40. 8 N.L.R.B. at 807. 
41. 315 U.S. at 102. 
42. 315 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added). 
43. 315 U.S. at 103. 
44. The court stated: 
[Southport] has filed ... for leave to adduce additional evidence to the effect that, subse-
quent to the entry of the order by the Board, it disposed of all of its assets, and was dis-
solved. [Southport] is a Texas corporation. Under the laws of that state the corporation, 
upon dissolution, is continued in existence for a period of three years for the purpose of 
suing and being sued. Conceding that the dissolution has taken place, it can have no effect 
upon this proceeding. 
NLRB v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1941), ajfd., 315 U.S. 100 (1942) 
(footnote omitted). 
45. See 315 U.S. 100, 108 (Reed, J., dissenting) (grant of certiorari was limited to the issue of 
leave to adduce additional evidence). See also Brief for NLRB at 2, Southport (No. 67) (same). 
46. 315 U.S. at 106. 
47. 315 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). Justice Jackson added that, "The additional evidence 
April 1988] Note - Alter Ego Doctrine 1031 
The Court's affi.rmance of the Board's order was directed at a 
clearly recalcitrant employer. Southport had ignored the Board's or-
der to remedy its unfair labor practices for ten months before entering 
into a stipulation to carry out the order.48 It then liquidated and trans-
ferred ownership only three days after stipulating its compliance - an 
act the Board considered to be an indication of "bad faith."49 Given 
the narrow issue presented to the Court, 50 and the evasive actions of 
an employer that clearly continued its business operations, there was 
no need to rule on whether an absence of intent to evade NLRA duties 
might be a defense to alter ego status. Likewise, there was no need to 
decide whether the presence of animus might nonetheless be irrelevant 
to determining such status. 
2. The Generally Accepted Factors: Crawford Door 
Following Southport, the courts of appeals have differed regarding 
the intent criterion,51 but have agreed on the seven objective factors 
enunciated by the NLRB in Crawford Door Sales Co. 52 In considering 
whether to apply the alter ego doctrine, the Board determines whether 
"the two enterprises have 'substantially identical' management, busi-
ness purpose, operation, equipment, customers, and supervision, as 
well as ownership."53 The test is flexible - the NLRB does not need 
to find the presence of all seven factors. In addition, the "substantially 
identical'' language provides additional flexibility with respect to each 
individual factor.54 
was immaterial for the further reason that the Board's order ran not only to the petitioner, but 
also its 'officers, agents, successors, and assigns.'" 315 U.S. at 106 (footnote omitted). 
48. 315 U.S. at 102. 
49. See Brief for NLRB at 6, Southport (No. 67). 
50. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text (leave to adduce additional evidence). 
51. See Part II infra. 
52. 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976). 
53. 226 N.L.R.B. at 1144. The Crawford factors are cited with approval in, e.g., Crest Tank-
ers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Dane County 
Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313, 1321 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579 
(6th Cir. 1986); Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984); Alkire v. 
NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983); Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 
1416, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553-54 (3d Cir. 1983), cerL 
denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 
489, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983). 
Although this Note refers to "the Board" as though it were a monolithic entity, the NLRB 
decisionmaking process begins with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who makes findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and rulings based on a hearing. Appeals of the ALJ's decisions are 
made to the NLRB. The Board's and ALJ's opinions will not be discussed separately unless 
otherwise noted. 
54. For example, in Dane County Dairy, the court held that "[f]amilial control constitutes 
common ownership and control.'' 795 F.2d at 1322; see also Advance Elec., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 
1001, 1004 (1984) ("all stock in both corporations was owned by members of the [same] family 
and all corporate officers and directors also were members of that family"); E.G. Sprinkler Corp., 
268 N.L.R.B. 1241, 1244 (citing Crawford Door, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1144) ("The Board has held 
that stock ownership in different corporations by members of the same family constitutes owner-
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For example, in NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., ss the Third Circuit 
enforced the Board's alter ego finding in spite of a legal change in own-
ership. The court provided the following summary of the relevant 
facts: 
[A] decline in the demand for composition work made the composing 
room unprofitable for Scott. Because he was having difficulty meeting 
non-union competition, Scott tried unsuccessfully to sell the composing 
room. After the Union informed ... employees that Scott intended to 
sell or to close down the composing room, [the employees], facing unem-
ployment, offered to buy it .... [The employees] signed the [sales] con-
tract without making any changes. s6 
The court held that "[a] nominal change in ownership is not disposi-
tive."s7 It looked at Crawford Door factors such as identical custom-
ers, operations, equipment, and supplies, but noted that "[t]he crucial 
element in a decision to apply the alter ego doctrine . . . is a finding 
that the older company continued to maintain a substantial degree of 
control over the business claimed to have been sold to the new 
entity."ss 
The Tenth Circuit appears to have added an eighth element to the 
Crawford Door analysis: 
Another factor to be considered is the continuity of the work force. If 
the second employer continues with substantially the same employees, 
the second employer is more likely to be deemed an alter ego of the first. 
If, however, the second employer has a substantially different work force 
than did the first employer, the second employer is more likely to be 
deemed a mere successor. S9 
Continuity of the work force is not, however, a helpful indicator of 
alter ego status. Although a new work force in an arms-length trans-
action would not indicate alter ego status, the lack of continuity of the 
work force in the absence of an arms-length change of ownership 
could provide excellent evidence that the "new" employer is in reality 
the alter ego of its predecessor. Taking the Tenth Circuit's analysis to 
ship and control which is 'substantially identical.'"), enforced sub nom. Goodman Piping Prods., 
741 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984). 
55. 612 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1979). 
56. 612 F.2d at 788. 
57. 612 F.2d at 786. 
58. 612 F.2d at 786 (noting with approval NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (7th 
Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added). The "control" element, however, is a gloss on the "ownership" 
factor, rather than a discrete eighth factor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dane County Dairy, 795 F.2d 
1313, 1322 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the Board had established "substantially identical owner-
ship and/or control"). Also, although the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test 
in Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983), focuses on the control element of 
Crawford Door, see text at note 158 infra, the court has not rejected the Board's right to weigh all 
seven criteria. 716 F.2d at 1018 & n.4. 
59. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Howard Johnson Co. 
v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974)) (italics 
in original). 
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an extreme, our "neutron bomb" employer60 could fire its entire work 
force out of sheer animus, and then make a bootstrap argument that 
because there is no "continuity of the work force," it is at most re-
quired to bargain with the union as a successor employer.6I There-
fore, continuity of the work force is a better indicator of an unfair 
labor practice once the employer is identified as an alter ego 
employer. 62 
Additionally, in enunciating its new factor, the Tenth Circuit also 
skirted the fine line dividing successorship and alter ego doctrines. In-
deed, the court's reliance on Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint 
Executive Board Hotel & Restaurant Employees63 demonstrates the 
need for understanding the difference between the alter ego and suc-
cessorship doctrines. 
C. The Successorship Doctrine 
"Successorship,"64 "alter ego," and "single employer," are three 
related, yet distinct, doctrines that address whether, and to what ex-
tent, "one business entity [will be held] to the labor obligations of an-
other."65 An examination of the single employer doctrine,66 and of 
60. See text at note 7 supra. 
61. See Part LC infra. 
62. Assuming the Crawford Door factors are met, both the "critical" and "relevant" ap-
proaches would find alter ego status based on the discriminatory firing of the work force. Like-
wise, an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach would use the discriminatory firing 
as evidence that there was a reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer which did not 
actually go out of business. (The distinction between a motive-based and objective standard is 
that a different result is reached under the motive-based standard when the motive is legitimate.) 
See Part II infra. 
63. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
64. The successorship doctrine is relatively well settled, having been addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court three times in the past two decades. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local 
Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Bums Intl. 
Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
The literature concerning the successorship doctrine is extensive. For commentary in addi-
tion to the brief coverage in Part I.C, see, e.g., Severson & Willcoxon, Successorship Under How-
ard Johnson: Short Order Justice For Employees, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1976); Morris & Gaus, 
Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Bums, 59 
VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973); Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-
A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (1973); St. Antoine, Judicial Cau-
tion and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 269, 
269-77 (discussing NLRB v. Bums Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)); Goldberg, The Labor 
Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (1969); Note, The Bargaining 
Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1975); Note, Contract Rights and the 
Successor Employer: The Impact of Bums Security, 71 MICH. L. REv. 571 (1973). 
65. Note, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 
625 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Bargaining Obligations]. 
66. The NLRB uses four criteria to determine whether two coexisting employers actually 
constitute a single employer: interrelation of operations, common management, centralized con-
trol of labor relations, and common ownership. See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians 
Local Union No. 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam). 
Although the alter ego doctrine may also be applied to coexisting employers, alter ego and sue-
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the "double-breasting" aspects67 to which both single employer and 
cessorship cases generally arise when a new legal entity has replaced a predecessor entity (the 
entities are sequential in time). 
Single employer and alter ego charges often arise in the same case. See, e.g., NLRB v. Al 
Bryant, Inc. 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); Penntech Papers, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Iowa Express Distribu-
tion, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984). Also, 
Professor Stephen Befort has pointed out that "the Board and the courts have recently begun to 
commingle the strands of the two doctrines. Three recent Board decisions describe the alter ego 
doctrine as 'an extension of the concept of single employer.' " Befort, Labor Law and the Double-
Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed 
Reformulation. 1987 Wis. L. REv. 67, 92 (footnote omitted). One of the three cases he describes 
states: 
We discuss "single employer'' and "alter ego" ... as though they were two separate ideas. 
In doing so, we adopt the approach of text-writers and digesters, to whose hearts such neat 
categories are dear. In fact, what is really happening ..• is that a number of factors ••• are 
being treated as relevant to the question whether an employer, formally separate, should be 
viewed as legally the same as another. 
Id. at 92-93 (quoting Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (8th 
Cir. 1986)). This Note adopts those "neat categories," which is appropriate given its focus on 
corporate transformations, which are sequential in time, rather than on the "double-breasting" 
context, involving coexisting entities. For additional discussion of the single employer doctrine, 
see generally id. at 75-89 (discussing the development and application of the single employer 
doctrine to "double-breasted" cases); Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 
F.2d 489, 504-07 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing application to double-breasted contractors), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983). 
67. "Double-breasting" originated in the construction industry to allow contractors to bid 
for both union and nonunion jobs. The employer establishes a "subsidiary compan[y] to work 
non-union jobs and compete in this market." Penfield, The Double-Breasted Operation in the 
Construction Industry, 27 LAB. L.J. 89, 89 (1976). See also Befort, supra note 66; Comment, 
Double-Breasted Operations in the Construction Industry: A Search for Concrete Guidelines, 6 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 45 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Double-Breasted Operations]; Comment, 
Dual Companies - When Does a Union Have the Right to Expanded Representation?, 12 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 89 (1977). See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note I, at 852-53 
(discussing "double-breasted" employers). Professor Befort has written an excellent and compre· 
hensive article on the subject. He points out the "failure of the single employer and alter ego 
doctrines as theoretical bases for evaluating double-breasted operations ... .'' Befort, supra note 
66, at 101. Befort proposes a four-part "double-breasting" test addressing "common ownership 
or continued financial benefit, diversion of unit work, appropriate bargaining unit, and motive.'' 
Id. He views the motive element as a relevant, but not prerequisite, factor. Id. at 104. Professor 
Befort's proposed test would help bring coherence to the traditional "double-breasting" cases, 
and might alleviate some of Congress's current concerns - in 1987 the House of Representatives 
passed legislation that "would prevent unionized construction companies from setting up sepa-
rate, nonunionized divisions," Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1987, § 2, at 15, col. l, although the legisla-
tion died in the Senate. Id. 
Although this Note does not address the "double-breasting" aspects of the alter ego doctrine, 
it does discuss and analyze "double-breasting" cases that fall outside of the traditional construc-
tion industry context. For example, in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 
1986), the predecessor employer, a moving company working both as an independent and as an 
Atlas Van Lines agent split into two successor companies - one union and one nonunion -
allegedly in response to an Atlas policy change prohibiting its agents from simultaneously operat· 
ing independently. See text at notes 136-39 infra. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, however: 
While these circumstances may explain the decision to create [the nonunion company] as a 
separate corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on [the 
employer's] part in refusing to apply to [the new company's] employees the terms and condi-
tions of employment which governed their performance of Atlas work prior to the change in 
corporate structure. 
Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1379, enforced, 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). Unlike the 
motive-based justification (which is nonetheless suspect) of construction employers who must bid 
on both union and nonunion jobs, there is no motive-based justification in the nontraditional 
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alter ego concepts are often applied, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
This subpart instead focuses on the "absolute distinction between alter 
ego concepts ... and so-called successorship cases."68 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's use of "continuity of the work force"69 as an alter ego criterion 
provides a reason for discussing the Supreme Court's own distinction 
between successorship and alter ego concepts and for reviewing the 
different policy concerns underlying the two doctrines. 
The different factual settings and legal consequences of suqcessor-
ship· and alter ego cases are summarized as follows: 
[T]he issue of successorship arises only when there is a bona fide 
purchase or sale, meaning an arm's length relinquishment of control be-
tween two independent entities. If the purchaser in a transaction is 
found to be an alter ego of the selling party, the seller's contractual obli-
gations will be applied to the purchaser/alter ego in their entirety.70 
While an alter ego employer is bound to the terms of its predecessor's 
collective bargaining contract, an arms-length successor employer71 is 
normally subject at most to an obligation to recognize and bargain 
with the predecessor's union.72 The different legal consequences illus-
case. As long as there is at least a partial cessation of business by the predecessor company, the 
"foreseeable benefit" approach proposed by this Note, see Part II.C infra, adequately protects 
employees without resort to Professor Befort's proposed test. The Sixth Circuit itself based its 
decision entirely on traditional alter ego analysis without reference to the "double-breasting" 
aspects of the case. 
68. Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 424 (1977) (statement of AIJ). 
69. See text at notes 59-63 supra. 
70. P. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: PLANT CLOSINGS, 
RELOCATIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION, 181 (Labor Rel. & Public Poly. Series, 
No. 24, 1983). See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & 
Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (distinguishing successor cases in which there is a 
"substantial change in . . . ownership or management" from alter ego cases lacking such a 
change); Dee Cee, 232 N.L.R.B. at 424 (successor employer is "always a stranger to the first ... 
employer"); Befort, supra note 66, at 73 ("The absence of an arm's length relationship distin-
guishes the single employer and alter ego situations from that of the normal successorship 
setting."). 
71. There is a dispute over the proper definition of "successor employer." See, e.g., Howard 
Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n.9 ("There is, and can be, no single definition of 'successor' which is 
applicable in every legal context. A new employer ... may be a successor for some purposes and 
not for others."); Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 643 n.129 ("'Successor' is a 
term of art, although many cases use it as a generic term for all new enterprises."); Note, The 
Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759, 759 n.l (1975) ("The 
term 'successor' has often been used to express a legal conclusion that the new employer should 
be held to certain of the obligations of its predecessor .... For clarity, the term as used [here] will 
not imply that the new employer is held to any obligations, but will be used merely to refer to the 
new employer."). This Note adopts the Harvard Law Review Note's use of the term as merely 
referring to the new employer. Where it is not clear from the context of the discussion, the term 
"arms-length successor" will be used to indicate a successor employer who is not bound to the 
terms of the collective bargaining contract of its predecessor. 
72. See NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281-82 (holding that an employer is 
not automatically held to the substantive terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining contract, 
even if it hires a majority of the predecessor's employees). It can be argued, however, that Burns 
did not involve a "true" successorship case. Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Brennan and Powell) argued in dissent that the successorship doctrine is based on 
"the need to grant some protection to employees from a sudden transformation of their em-
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trate the danger of commingling the two doctrines. 
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of "continuity in the work force" as 
an alter ego criterion erroneously relies on the successorship cases. 
The court cites Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive 
Board Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 13 which held that an arms-
length successor is not required to arbitrate74 the predecessor em-
ployer's collective bargaining contract unless there is substantial con-
tinuity of the work force.75 There are important distinctions, however, 
between the arms-length successorship and alter ego cases. The 
ployer's business that results in the substitution of a new legal entity, not bound by the collective-
bargaining contract ... but leaves intact significant elements of the employer's business." 406 
U.S. at 301. Such a need is not present when the successor employer acquires none of the prede-
cessor's "tangible or intangible assets,'' 406 U.S. at 305, and the new employer's "only connec-
tion with the old employer [was] the hiring of some of the latter's employees." 406 U.S. at 306. 
Shortly after Burns was decided, Professor Theodore St. Antoine wrote, "the door has been 
left open for the Court to distinguish Burns in some of the more typical successorship situations 
of sale or merger, and to find the predecessor's contract binding on a true successor." St. An· 
toine, supra note 64, at 276. The Court's Howard Johnson decision in 1974 did not close the door 
on Professor St. Antoine's contention. The Court held that an employer is not required to bar· 
gain with its predecessor's union if there is not "continuity of identity in the business enterprise 
[which] necessarily includes ... substantial continuity in the identity of the work force.'' Howard 
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 
263 (1974). Because the successor employer in Howard Johnson did not hire a majority of its 
predecessor's work force, the Court did not need to address the duty to bargain and contract 
enforceability issues in the event of continuity. It specifically found it "unnecessary . , . to decide 
... whether there is any irreconcilable conflict between Wiley and Burns." 417 U.S. at 256. 
Finally, the Court notes: "Particularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the 
myriad factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congres-
sional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises is especially 
appropriate." 417 U.S. at 256. 
It is thus possible that Professor St. Antoine's distinction of Burns is still valid, and that a 
contract might be binding on a "true" successor. He maintains that this possibility continues to 
exist. Interview with Theodore J. St. Antoine, James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 20, 1988). If the distinction does exist, this Note's 
argument for an objective standard is strengthened, because if an arms-length successor can be 
bound to the terms of its predecessor's contract, a fortiori an alter ego employer with the same 
ownership and control should be bound to its predecessor's contract regardless of its motive for 
changing corporate form. 
73. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing 417 U.S. 249 (1974)). 
See text at note 59 supra. 
74. Howard Johnson, as well as the earlier successorship case of John Wiley & Sons v. Living· 
ston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), arose under§ 30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Section 301 gives United States district courts jurisdiction 
to hear suits to enforce collective bargaining contracts. The Howard Jolt11so11 Court stated, 
however: 
It would be plainly inconsistent ... to say that the basic policies found controlling in an 
unfair labor practice context may be disregarded by the courts in a suit under § 301, and 
thus to permit the rights enjoyed by the new employer in a successorship context to depend 
upon the forum in which the union presses its claims. 
417 U.S. at 256. See also Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 
489, 511 (5th Cir. 1982) (alter ego and single employer case recognizing same principle). 
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that suits arise in two different 
forums - § 301 arbitration suits initiated in federal district court and unfair labor practice suits 
initiated in NLRB agency proceedings - and that both are appealable to United States courts of 
appeals. The forum is not, however, outcome-determinative. 
75. 417 U.S. at 262-64. 
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Court's own language distinguishes the concepts; in Howard Johnson, 
Justice Marshall writes: 
[T]his is not a case where the successor corporation is the "alter ego" of 
the predecessor, where it is "merely the disguised continuance of the old 
employer." Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 
(1942). Such cases involve a mere technical change in the structure or 
identity of the employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor 
laws, without any substantial change in its ownership or management. 
In these circumstances, the courts have had little difficulty holding that 
the successor is in reality the same employer and is subject to all the legal 
and contractual obligations of the predecessor. 76 
It is important to understand that the two doctrines are based on 
different underlying policies. The Court's policy concern in the 
arms-length successorship cases is that "[a] potential employer may be 
willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes 
in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, ... and nature 
of supervision."77 In contrast, the alter ego doctrine focuses on 
whether the successor "is in reality the same employer."78 "The same 
employer," in terms of the Crawford Door criteria,79 cannot be allowed 
to escape its contractual obligations by eliminating its union employ-
ees and then claiming "no substantial continuity of identity in the 
work force."80 
Although the following point is unrelated to analyzing the validity 
of "work force" as an alter ego criterion, one final observation should 
be made about Justice Marshall's description of the alter ego doctrine 
in Howard Johnson. He explains that in alter ego cases an employer 
may "frequently" change its structure to avoid its NLRA duties. This 
suggests that there may be circumstances involving a corporate trans-
formation not motivated by a desire to avoid labor commitments that 
should nonetheless result in alter ego status. 
The terms "frequently" and "in reality the same employer" both 
suggest that an objective inquiry into the alter ego status of a successor 
employer is appropriate. A motive-based standard cannot, however, 
be so easily dismissed. The uncertainty over the role of motive is illus-
trated both by the fact that the courts and the Board have not ac-
76. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added). 
77. 417 U.S. at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Bums Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972)). 
The policy considerations attendant to successorship vis-a-vis alter ego are discussed at greater 
length in Part III.B infra. 
78. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5. 
79. See Part I.B supra. 
80. 417 U.S. at 264. For example, in NLRB v. McAllister Bros., the "new" employer used 
its " 'imagination and talent to initiate an unusual but effective operational change' " which basi-
cally consisted of eliminating a large number of union employees. 819 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 
1987). (Technically, the argument would be that the "new" employer did not hire the predeces-
sor's union employees.) The court had no trouble finding an alter ego relationship between the 
old and new employers; however, if work force were a factor, the task would be unjustifiably 
more difficult. 
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cepted (nor have they considered) the above interpretation of Justice 
Marshall's dicta and by their divergent approaches to a motive-based 
standard. Part II provides an examination of this role. 
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE 
Despite agreement among the courts of appeals and the NLRB on 
the Crawford Door criteria, 81 disagreement persists over the role of 
employer motive in determining alter ego status.82 This Note places 
the various positions taken on motive83 by the courts and the Board 
into three broad categories - "critical," "relevant, but not prerequi-
site," and "reasonably foreseeable benefit." Within each category, the 
underlying rationale and possible arguments for and against the ap-
proach are discussed. Ultimately, all of the current approaches are 
rejected based on the conclusion that motive is an inappropriate con-
sideration - whether a "successor employer is in reality the same em-
ployer"84 (i.e., an alter ego) should depend on the identity of the entity 
itself, not on its reason for becoming that entity. An objective test 
based on a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard is pro-
posed to accomplish this result. 
81. See Part I.B supra. 
82. "Disagreement" is an understatement - almost every court of appeals has considered 
the role of motive in determining alter ego status, and even though this Note groups the courts 
into three broad categories, there are several discrete positions within those categories. See 
Befort, supra note 66, at 95-98 (grouping the courts into slightly different, but equally fractured, 
categories). 
The NLRB's position is also inconsistent: 
The Board has repeatedly sidestepped the motive issue without adopting an identifiable posi-
tion. Some cases suggest that the Board considers an improper motive to be a sufficient but 
not required basis for an alter ego finding. More frequently, the Board describes motive as 
an important additional factor that must be considered. 
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted). 
83. This Note uses the terms "motive," "intent to evade," and "anti-union animus" inter-
changeably. These terms encompass more than just a personal dislike of the union -;-- motive 
refers to any labor-related reason. For example, in Advance Elec., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001 
(1984), the Board rejected the employer's defense that its change in corporate form was moti-
vated by "economic reasons," equating "the purpose of eliminating the high costs associated with 
operating Advance as a union contractor" with "evad(ing] Advance's responsibility under the 
Act to honor its collective bargaining agreement." 268 N.L.R.B. at 1004. See also Watt Elec. 
Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 655, 658 (1984) (ALJ stated, "Although Watt did not .•. harbor any personal 
dislike, animus, or hate for the Union, the absence of such a motivation is not determinative"); 
Samuel Kosoff & Sons, 269 N.L.R.B. 424, 429 (1984) (The element of motivation was established 
where Kosoff admitted to attempting to achieve a competitive position by operation a nonunion 
firm.); Hageman Underground Constr., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 68 (1980) ("The new company is con-
sidered an alter ego or disguised continuance of the old one when it is set up to enable a company 
to continue operating while ridding itself of a union ... even though motivated by economic 
considerations."); Befort, supra note 66, at 86 & n.125 (discussing Watt). Cf. note 110 infra and 
accompanying text. The motive-based terms used herein should thus be read as labor-related 
(motivated by, e.g., high union costs) and nonlabor-related (e.g., Atlas's policy change in Al/coast, 
note 137 infra). 
84. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. Hotel & Restaurant Employ-
ees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974). 
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A. The "Critical" Standard 
Three federal courts of appeals have arguably adopted an examina-
tion of "[u]nlawful motive or intent [as the] critical inquir[y] in an 
alter ego analysis."85 The First and Eighth Circuits have explicitly 
ruled to this effect, 86 while the Third Circuit probably falls into this 
category.87 The NLRB itself has not taken a clear position;88 while 
most of the Board's decisions apply a "relevant" standard, 89 two re-
cent cases indicate that some NLRB members consider motive to be 
critical.90 However, examination of the merits of the "critical" stan-
dard demonstrates that it is the least justifiable of the positions cur-
rently taken. 
As an initial observation, the cases are almost devoid of discussion 
justifying the "critical" standard. The courts adhering to this stan-
dard generally refer to commentators and sister courts for support,91 
85. Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 
(1983). 
86. Penntech, 106 F.2d at 24; Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 
237 (8th Cir. 1986) ("A critical part of the inquiry into alter ego status ... is whether the 
employers acted out of anti-union sentiment or to avoid a labor contract."). See also Iowa Ex-
press Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1088 (1984). 
The First and Eighth Circuits have both cited the Tenth Circuit as also supporting intent as a 
critical element. See Penntech, 106 F.2d at 24 (citing NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 
(10th Cir. 1980)); Iowa Express, 739 F.2d at 1311 (same). But see NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, 
Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Tricor as holding intent "relevant, but 
... [not] essential"). The Sixth Circuit would seem to have the better argument, given the Tenth 
Circuit's statement that "[t]here is no hard-and-fast rule." Tricor, 636 F.2d at 270. 
87. The Third Circuit uses "fence-sitting" language such as "[a]ssuming without deciding 
that in this case the General Counsel must prove ... inten[t] to evade," NLRB v. Scott Printing 
Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1979), and "it is significant, if not crucial, that [the new 
employer] was created after the filing of unfair labor practice charges. " NLRB v. Al Bryant, 
Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 554 (3d Cir. 1983). 
88. A precise understanding of each of the standards being applied by the Board and the 
courts is actually less important than the fact that no consistent and justifiable standard is cur-
rently being applied. One commentary on double-breasting is equally appropriate in traditional 
alter ego cases: "[l]n an area where concrete standards, applied with uniformity, are crucial to 
unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable." Comment, Double-
Breasted Operations, supra note 67, at 48. 
89. See note 133 infra. 
90. In Apex Decorating Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1985), the Board's members could not 
agree on what standard they were applying to the case. The Board's opinion states: 
In adopting the [AU's] findings, we have relied on all the factors set forth in his decision, 
including employer motivation .... [Member Dennis] declines to join us in this paragraph 
because in her view antiunion motivation is not a sine qua non for a finding of alter ego 
status. However, we have made no such assertion in stating our reasons for finding [alter ego 
status]. 
275 N.L.R.B. at 1459 n.3 (emphasis added). Similar confusion over the appropriate standard is 
apparent in Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1314 n.l (1985) (Board upheld AU's 
alter ego finding despite lack of intent; one member agreed on the ground that employer had not 
"rebutted the General Counsel's prima facie case of union animus"). See also Befort, supra note 
66, at 98 (discussing Leslie Oldsmobile). 
91. See, e.g., Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir. 
1986) (citing Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984), which in tum quotes Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 
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but these sources themselves fail to provide a rationale for the posi-
tion, 92 and predate the alter ego cases decided in the 1980s that ad-
dress the role of motive. Three of the strongest arguments supporting 
the standard, all of which ultimately fail, are the courts' reliance on 
the language of Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 93 a statement by 
the Eighth Circuit that appears to "temper" its position, and a possible 
analogy to the "runaway shop" context in which some courts of ap-
peals allow a "business necessity" defense to a finding that a plant 
removal or relocation violates section 8(a)(3).94 
At first glance it seems that those courts employing a "critical" 
standard most closely follow the language and holding of Southport. 
The Supreme Court explicitly stated the question as "[ w ]hether there 
was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership -
which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the 
Board's order - or merely a disguised continuance of the old em-
ployer .... " 95 The courts following the "critical" standard have ex-
tended this language in stating that the purpose of the test is to prevent 
a "sham transfer of assets. "96 
Although the language of Southport might seem to support this 
extension, the Court's holding was limited to much narrower grounds 
in which the intent to evade was clear.97 In addition, the array of 
court and Board opinions examined in this Part demonstrates that 
there is no clear agreement as to what the language of Southport re-
quires. Finally, the Supreme Court itself has cast doubt on the limit-
ing language of Southport in the successorship case of Howard Johnson 
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees.98 Justice Marshall's description of alter ego cases as involving 
"mere technical change[s] .. . frequently to avoid the effect of the labor 
24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)). Iowa Express also cites Note, Bargaining Obliga-
tions, supra note 65, at 638-39; Penntech Papers, 706 F.2d at 24 (citing NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 
636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980), and quoting Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 
638); NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 790 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Slicker, supra 
note 64, at 1064 and T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW§ 17.02[3] (1972)). 
92. E.g., Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 639 (stating that an "employer must 
act from anti-union animus"). The Note does not give a reason for the requirement, and simply 
cites a Sixth Circuit case from 1963, NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 
1963), which is no longer valid law in that jurisdiction. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 
F.2d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 1986) (intent is "relevant"). 
93. 315 U.S. 100 (1942). 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). 
95. Southport, 315 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). 
96. Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 238 (8th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1088 (1984), which in turn quotes Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983)). 
97. See Part I.B.l supra. 
98. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
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laws,"99 and his statement that the purpose of the alter ego inquiry is 
to determine whether the successor employer "is in reality the same 
employer,"100 suggest intent is not required. At most, intent should be 
a "relevant" consideration in those "frequent" cases described by the 
Court. This Note maintains, however, that it is better to concentrate 
on the "same employer" language - inquiring as to whether an entity 
is objectively unchanged - rather than asking the reason for a techni-
cal change in corporate form.101 
Proponents of the "critical" standard may attempt to justify it as 
simply a stronger form of the "relevant" standard. In Crest Tankers, 
Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 102 the Eighth Circuit stated: 
The Sixth Circuit has recently accepted an argument that a finding of 
anti-union animus or "employer intent [to evade obligations under the 
NLRA] is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status." 
NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) .... 
A requirement that employer intent be demonstrated could hinder the 
goals of the doctrine, the Al/coast Court said: "[A]n employer who de-
sired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the doc-
trine by altering the corporations's structure based on some legitimate 
business reason, retaining essentially the same business and utilizing the 
change to escape the unwanted obligations." 780 F.2d at 582. We con-
sider the difference between this statement and our position . . . to be 
largely one of degree, and note that the mere existence of "some legiti-
mate business reason" for a change in corporate organization should not 
alone prevent a finding of alter ego status. 103 
This argument is deficient in two respects. First, it has little force 
unless one accepts the proposition that intent has some role i.n an alter 
ego analysis. 104 Second, the "difference ... of degree" is vast - the 
Eighth Circuit reads Al/coast too narrowly. Although the Al/coast 
court is concerned with the danger of pretext in that case, it states the 
alter ego test in broader terms: "[A] finding of employer intent ... is 
merely one of the relevant factors the Board can consider . . . . [T]he 
alter ego analysis should be .flexible."105 The test does not rule out 
finding alter ego status without considering intent - the Board could 
even find alter ego status if an employer's sole justification for its cor-
porate transformation was a legitimate business reason.106 In contrast, 
99. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added). See Part l.C supra. 
100. 417 U.S. at 259 n.5 (emphasis added). 
101. See Parts 11.C and III infra. 
102. 796 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1986). 
103. 796 F.2d at 238 n.2 (bracketed material in original, selected citations omitted, emphasis 
added). 
104. This Note rejects all of the motive-based standards in favor of an objective test. See 
Parts 11.B, 11.C & III infra. 
105. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). 
106. However, this interpretation of A/lcoast may itself be too broad. The court states that 
"[a]n inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situations involving application of 
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the Board has no such flexibility under the Eighth Circuit's test - it 
can consider the Crawford Door factors "'til the cows come home," 
but ultimately it cannot find alter ego status without first finding an 
intent to evade. 
A third potential justification for the "critical" standard turns on 
an analogy to the "runaway shop" cases, in which the employer relo-
cates, or shifts work from a union to a nonunion plant. While "[t]here 
is general agreement that if the employer's move is motivated by hos-
tility toward and a desire to escape the union, the action violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(3),"107 the Supreme Court has not spoken ,on whether 
animus is required, 108 and some courts of appeals have allowed a 
"business necessity" defense. 109 Considering intent to be a "critical" 
requirement in alter ego cases likewise implies that a "business neces-
sity" defense110 would negate an alter ego finding. 
The analogy between the use of intent in "runaway shop" cases 
and its use in alter ego situations does not survive close examination. 
First, the factual context and legal consequences in which "runaway 
shop" and alter ego cases arise implicate different policies. In an alter 
ego case, the employer's argument is that the reason it is neither obli-
the alter ego doctrine but here it simply is not necessary." 780 F.2d at 583. It notes that "the 
record shows some evidence of anti-union animus." 780 F.2d at 583 n.9. 
107. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 246. See Local 57, Intl. Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citation 
omitted) ("While an employer may terminate his business for any reason, it is equally well-settled 
that he may not transfer its situs to deprive his employees of rights protected by Section 7."), 
cert denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). 
108. Although the Court has ruled that "an employer has the absolute right to terminate his 
entire business for any reason," Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 
268 (1965), it specifically stated in that case that it was "not presented .•• with a case of a 
'runaway shop,' whereby Darlington would transfer its work to another plant or open a new 
plant in another locality to replace its closed plant." 380 U.S. at 272. 
109. See, e.g .. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Though 
there may have been animosity between the Union and Rapid, animosity furnishes no basis for 
the inference that this was the preponderant motive for the move when convincing evidence was 
received demonstrating business necessity."); NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 
1960) ("[T]he change was made because of reasonably anticipated increased costs, regardless of 
whether this increased costs [sic] was caused by the advent of the Union or by some other factor 
... . "),cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961). It could be argued, however, that the alter ego cases 
themselves militate against considering intent as "critical," because the courts involved - the 
Second and Sixth Circuits - have both rejected intent as "critical" in an alter ego context. 
The economic motive/animus distinction is itself open to criticism. Some questions raised in 
the "runaway shop" context are: 
Is it practical, or even possible, to authorize relocations or plant removals motivated by the 
anticipation of increased costs which a union will bring, but to hold illegal such action when 
motivated by "anti-union animus"? What is anti-union animus, if not a resistance to the 
union because of the economic burdens it will impose ... 7 Are not these added labor-
related costs exactly what engenders employer antipathy toward the union? How often is it 
that the employer nurtures "anti-union animus" which is not economically based? If such is 
rare indeed, then what is left of Section 8(a)(3) in these kinds of cases? 
A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 247. 
110. A "business necessity" defense was in essence asserted by the employer in Al/coast. See 
Part 11.B infra. 
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gated to bargain nor bound to its predecessor's collective bargaining 
contract is because it is an entirely "new" corporation. In contrast, a 
"runaway shop" involves the same employer - there is no contention 
that the employer is free of all obligations due to the relocation. Even 
though an employer may not have the duty to bargain with the union 
over its decision to shift work, it will still be bound to bargain over the 
effects of its decision, and may also be required to continue recogniz-
ing the union. 
Second, "runaway shops" generally involve some finding of dis-
crimination under section 8(a)(3). 111 Alter ego cases, in contrast, al-
most always focus on refusal-to-bargain charges under section 8(a)(5), 
and only sometimes involve discrimination charges under section 
8(a)(3). 112 The Supreme Court set out the appropriate section 8(a)(5) 
standard in NLRB v. Katz. 113 In that case, the employer unilaterally 
changed several terms that were the subject of upcoming negotiations 
with the union. 114 The Court rejected the employer's argument that it 
had changed the terms in "good faith," stating: 
A refusal to negotiate in/act as to any subject which is within§ 8(d), and 
about which the union seeks to negotiate, violates § 8(a)(5) though the 
employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an 
over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains 
to that end. . . . [I]t is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which 
frustrates the objectives of§ 8( a)(5) much as does a flat refusal. 115 
Nothing circumvents an alter ego employer's duty to negotiate more 
than a flat refusal to bargain with the union on any subject. Unlike the 
"runaway shop" cases, in which the union continues to be recognized 
and bargained with, the alter ego employer - claiming to be entirely 
"new" - refuses to recognize the union, to bargain, and to honor its 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Finally, even conceding that section 8(a)(3) has general applicabil-
ity to alter ego cases, this does not justify the "critical" standard. The 
Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co. 116 supports the 
proposition that some employer actions do not require a specific find-
111. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note I, at 246. 
112. See note 12 supra. See also Cox, A Reexamination of the Role of Employer Motive under 
Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
161, 170 (1982) (footnotes omitted) ("The standard wisdom has been and continues to be that 
motive ... is an element of Section 8(a)(3)."). 
113. 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
114. 369 U.S. at 737. 
115. 369 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added). 
116. 373 U.S. 221 (1963). The Erie Resistor analysis is also applied in "lockout" cases. See 
American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 
U.S. 26 (1967). "Lockouts" are the counterpart to an employee strike - the employer "locks 
out," i.e., withholds work from, the employees as an economic weapon/response to the employ-
ees' concerted activities. Although a discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Note, 
the literature concerning "lockout" cases is extensive. See Cox, supra note 112, at 163 n.4 (listing 
14 sources). 
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ing of intent because they are inherently destructive of employee 
rights. In Erie Resistor, the employer decided to continue operations 
after its union employees went on strike. 117 It hired replacement 
workers, giving them "super-seniority" (by adding twenty years to the 
length of service) for purposes of future layoffs and recalls. 118 Nine 
months after the strike ended, Erie's work force was half its prestrike 
size, and many of the union workers without "super-seniority" had 
been laid off. 119 The union filed unfair-labor-practice charges under 
sections 8(a)(l) and (3), challenging the super-seniority plan and the 
resulting layoffs. 120 The NLRB's holding that specific evidence of dis-
criminatory intent was not required was reversed by the Third Cir-
cuit.121 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Board, stating: 
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence 
of a finding of specific illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is al-
ways a defense to an unfair labor practice charge .... "Some conduct 
may by its very nature contain the implications of the required intent; 
the natural foreseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the 
inference .... " 
The outcome may well be the same [as when specific evidence of sub-
jective intent is shown] when intent is founded upon the inherently dis-
criminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in 
such cases must be held to intend the very consequences which 
foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions .... 122 
The destructive effect of a corporate transformation on employee 
rights is equally evident in an examination of the policy considerations 
attendant to alter ego cases.123 Thus, whether the problem is ap-
proached from a section 8(a)(3) discrimination perspective, or from 
that of a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain, 124 the "critical" standard 
(as well as the standards below that consider intent in some lesser de-
gree) cannot be justified. 
117. 373 U.s, at 222-23. 
118. 373 U.S. at 223. 
119. 373 U.S. at 224. 
120. 373 U.S. at 224. 
121. 373 U.S. at 225-26. 
122. 373 U.S. at 227-28 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiterated 
this position in the "lockout" cases. See American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 
(1965) ("[S]ome practices ... are inherently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of 
significant economic justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union member-
ship or other antiunion animus is required."); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 
34 (1967) ("[I]f it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was 
'inherently destructive' of important employee rights, no proof of anti-union motivation is 
needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence 
that the conduct was motivated by business considerations."). 
123. See Part III infra. 
124. See text at notes 111-15 supra. 
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B. The ''Relevant, but Not Prerequisite" Standard 
In contrast to the "critical" standard, seven federal courts of ap-
peals - the Second, 125 Fifth, 126 Sixth, 127 Seventh, 128 Ninth, 129 
Tenth,130 and District of Columbia131 Circuits - have in varying de-
grees adopted a standard in which "employer intent is not essential or 
prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one 
of the relevant factors the Board can consider .... " 132 Most of the 
NLRB's members have also apparently adopted this approach. 133 
Although there are several discrete "variations on a theme" among the 
courts in stating the "relevant" standard, 134 the differences are not sig-
nificant to analyzing the merits of this approach. The focus in this 
discussion will therefore center on the Sixth Circuit's thoughtful re-
flection on the "relevant" standard in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, 
125. Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1984). 
126. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 508 (5th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983). 
127. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986). 
128. NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1268 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit ap-
peared to require intent in a more recent case by including "unlawful motivation" in its recitation 
of the elements proven by the General Counsel. NLRB v. Dane County Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313, 
1322 (7th Cir. 1986). However, the employer was "openly hostile," 795 F.2d at 1322, and the 
court makes no mention of Bell. It is safe to assume that the Seventh Circuit still adheres to the 
"relevant" standard. 
129. Tanaka Constr. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 1982). 
130. NLRB v. Tricor Prods., 636 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1980). 
131. Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
132. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986). 
133. See, e.g., Apex Decorating Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1459 n.2 (1985); Advance Elec., 
Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1002 (1984); Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1302 
(1982), enforced, 725 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Watt Elec. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 655, 658 (1984) 
(statement of AU); Samuel Kosoff & Sons, 269 N.L.R.B. 424, 429 (1984) (statement of AU). 
134. For example, both the Second and Sixth Circuits stress a "flexible approach ... allowing 
the Board to weigh all the relevant factors instead of requiring it to always show the employer's 
intent to evade." Al/coast, 780 F.2d at 582; Goodman Piping Prods. v. NLRB, 741 F.2d 10, 11 
(2d Cir. 1984). The D.C. Circuit has assigned a slightly greater role to motive, giving it "sub-
stantial weight." Fugazy, 725 F.2d at 1419. 
Although there is some dispute about the Tenth Circuit's position, see note 86 supra, the 
court's language positions it most comfortably with the "relevant" standard. In Tricor, the court 
states: 
There is no hard-and-fast rule. If an employer makes changes in its business operation to 
deliberately get rid of the union, the employer is more likely to be an alter ego. If, however, 
the employer has legitimate economic reasons for the changes, and is not motivated by anti-
union sentiment, the second employer is more likely to be deemed a mere successor .... 
[W]e think evidence of anti-union sentiment by an employer ... is germane. 
636 F.2d at 270 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's position on the role of motive is unclear. While it has stated that 
"[n]o factor is controlling and all need not be present," Tanaka Constr. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 
1033 (9th Cir. 1982), seemingly placing it in the "relevant" category, it cites the Radio Union 
"single employer" factors as its alter ego test. See note 66 supra. The Fifth Circuit has pointed 
out the Ninth Circuit's failure to see that "the doctrines are conceptually distinct." Carpenters 
Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 508 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982). See also 
Befort, supra note 66, at 100 & n.233 (same). 
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Inc. 135 This subpart will show that although Allcoast overcomes many 
of the shortcomings of the "critical" standard, the "relevant" standard 
still retains the potential of failing at both extremes - erroneously 
failing to find alter ego status by allowing a legitimate business justifi-
cation defense, and.finding alter ego status by considering animus even 
though the predecessor employer received no foreseeable benefit. 
A brief recitation of Allcoast's facts will help in understanding the 
court's analysis of the "relevant" standard. The employer originally 
operated in the moving business under both its own Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) license and as an agent for Atlas Van Lines 
under Atlas's ICC license.136 Atlas subsequently adopted a new policy 
prohibiting its agents from operating concurrently under their own 
and Atlas's licenses; however, Atlas suggested that operating the 
licenses under two separate corporations would be acceptable. 137 Mr. 
Harris, the owner, took Atlas's advice and split the predecessor corpo-
ration into two successor companies. 138 While he conceded that one of 
the new entities (Allcoast Transfer) was bound to the predecessor's 
collective bargaining agreement, he claimed that the second entity 
(Ward Moving) was a "new" corporation and was free from all collec-
tive bargaining obligations.139 
There was no dispute that the Crawford Door factors were met. 140 
Harris's sole contention was that intent to evade "is a prerequisite for 
imposition of alter ego status,"141 and that the "change in corporate 
form was necessitated solely by Atlas' policy change."142 After thor-
oughly examining the existing standards - "critical," "relevant, but 
not prerequisite," and "foreseeable benefit" - Judge Contie, speaking 
for a unanimous court, concluded that "a finding of employer intent is 
not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, 
it is merely one of the relevant factors .... "143 
Judge Contie's arguments against adopting a "critical" standard 
were based on the danger of pretext and on the need for flexibility: 
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who 
135. 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). 
136. 780 F.2d at 577. 
137. 780 F.2d at 577-78. 
138. 780 F.2d at 578. 
139. 780 F.2d at 578. As discussed earlier, Al/coast is a nontraditional "double·breasting" 
case. See note 67 supra. 
140. See Part l.B supra. For example, the Board found identical ownership of the corpora· 
tions. 780 F.2d at 582. Mr. Harris admitted, "I own both companies .••• " Brief for NLRB at 
14, Al/coast (No. 84-591). As was noted earlier, however, neither the Board nor the courts re· 
quire absolute identity of ownership. See note 54 supra. Mr. Harris also managed both com pa· 
nies and made all major policy decisions. 780 F.2d at 582. In addition, both companies used 
their equipment interchangeably and operated out of the same facility. 780 F.2d at 578. 
141. 780 F.2d at 579. 
142. 780 F.2d at 579. 
143. 780 F.2d at 581. 
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desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the 
doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate 
business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the 
change to escape unwanted obligations. Our flexible approach will dis-
courage such attempts at circumvention by allowing the Board to weigh 
all the relevant factors .... Accordingly, even when purportedly legiti-
mate reasons support an alteration in structure, the Board can prevent an 
employer from avoiding obligations under the Act. 144 
The court's pretextual argument is a valid criticism of the "critical" 
standard, given that employers with evasive intent have in fact made 
this contention. 145 Unfortunately, the "flexibility" given to the Board 
to prevent circumvention by ''purportedly legitimate reasons" leaves 
open the possibility of a defense to alter ego status when there actually 
is a legitimate business justification.146 As Part III maintains, legiti-
mate employee expectations will be defeated if an entity that is "in 
reality the same employer,"147 determined on an objective basis, can 
avoid its collective bargaining obligations for any reason - including 
a nonlabor-related reason.14s 
At the other extreme, the "flexibility" provided by the Al/coast de-
cision could potentially result in the Board's overvaluing the presence 
of animus - finding an alter ego relationship where there is no fore-
seeable benefit to the predecessor employer - contravening Textile 
144. 780 F.2d at 582 (emphasis added). 
145. Harris in Al/coast may have had such evasive intent. The court noted: "[E]ven though 
the Board made no finding regarding Harris' intent, the record shows some evidence of anti-
union animus. At the hearing before the AU, Harris testified "I don't want it [the union], I'll be 
honest with you, who needs it, who wants it." 780 F.2d at 583 n.9 (brackets in original). See also 
note 146 infra; notes 207-14 infra and accompanying text. 
146. Judge Contie states, "An inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situ-
ations involving application of the alter ego doctrine •... " 780 F.2d at 583. He continues, 
"Harris viewed a change in corporate structure as the opportunity to evade unwanted obligations 
under the Act.". 780 F.2d at 583 n.9. The general tenor of the court's discussion leaves open the 
possibility that an alter ego relationship might not be found if there were a corporate transforma-
tion in response to a legitimate business reason, even if the "new" employer were "in reality the 
same employer." 
The Board's decision not to find alter ego status might go something like this: "Animus is 
relevant; there is no animus present in this case, so the employer's good faith transformation 
outweighs the other Crawford Door criteria which are admittedly present." But see Reply Brief 
for Respondent at 5, Al/coast (No. 84-5961) ("It is undoubtedly true that intent alone cannot give 
rise to a Section 8(a)(5) violation: an employer may unabashedly hope to 'evade his obligations 
under the Act' but, in the absence of sufficient organizational similarity, the employer presuma-
bly could not be deemed to be an alter ego.") (emphasis in original). 
147. See text at note 76 supra. 
148. To argue that the successor employer who is "in reality the same employer" should be 
allowed to avoid its union obligations because of a change for a nonlabor-related reason is a non 
sequitur. As the ALJ pointed out in Al/coast: 
While these circumstances may explain the decision to create Ward Moving as a separate 
corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on Harris' part 
in refusing to apply ... the terms and conditions of employment which governed their 
performance of Atlas work prior to the change in corporate structure. 
Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1379 (1984) (statement of ALJ), enforced, NLRB v. 
Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 149 The Eighth Cir-
cuit's explanation of the relevance of motive, although in the context 
of the "critical" standard, provides a glimpse of this danger: 
[A] number of factors, including anti-union motivation, are being treated 
as relevant to the question whether one employer, formally separate, 
should be viewed as legally the same as another. When the requisite 
degree of anti-union motivation is present, this question is answered 
"yes," even though the other factors considered might not suffice to pro-
duce this result. 1so 
One example of animus overvaluation is the NLRB's decision in 
Denzil S. Alkire. 1s1 In that case, the Board overruled the ALJ's find-
ing that, despite animus evident by both the employer and union, 1s2 
the Supreme Court's holding in Darlington allowed the employer to go 
out of business. 1s3 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Board's finding of 
alter ego status based on the lack of a foreseeable benefit to the prede-
cessor employer.1s4 The Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable ben-
efit" approach ....:.... which prevents the overvaluation of animus 
displayed by the Board in Alkire - was rejected out of hand by Judge 
Con tie as falling within the "critical" rubric. 1ss If the Fourth Circuit's 
test unambiguously fell within this rubric, Judge Contie's rejection of 
the test would be appropriate; however, the test can also be applied on 
an objective basis, and thus deserves additional scrutiny. 
C. The ''Reasonably Foreseeable Benefit" Standard 
The Fourth Circuit's approach to the alter ego test is based on the 
concept of a "reasonably foreseeable benefit." In Alkire v. NLRB, 156 
Judge Gordon, speaking for a divided court, stated the two-step 
analysis: 
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether 
substantially the same entity controls both the old and new employer. If 
this control exists, then the inquiry must turn to whether the transfer 
resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old em-
ployer related to the elimination of its labor obligations. 157 
149. 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) ("an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire 
business for any reason he pleases"). 
150. Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986). 
151. 259 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1982), enforcement denied, Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th 
Cir. 1983). For a detailed discussion of the case, see notes 160-69 infra and accompanying text. 
152. "When Alkire [the employer] told the assembled employees that he could not afford to 
operate under union scale, they responded with applause." 259 N.L.R.B. at 1329. 
153. See text at notes 164-67 infra. 
154. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1021. The Fourth Circuit's "foreseeable benefit" approach is dis-
cussed at length in Part II.C infra. 
155. See NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 579 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986) ("A similar, 
but purportedly broader [than the 'critical' standard], approach was adopted by the Fourth Cir· 
cuit .... "). 
156. 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). 
157. 716 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added). 
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The "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides an excellent founda-
tion for overcoming the problems of both the "critical" and "relevant" 
standards. This section explores the court's rationale for the ap-
proach, its advantages relative to the previously discussed standards, 
and two ways in which it can be strengthened - first, through the 
explicit retention of the Crawford Door factors; 158 and second, by con-
sidering whether the change "resulted in"159 a foreseeable benefit, re-
gardless of the motive for that change. 
In Alkire, the employer informed his employees that he was going 
out of business, and subsequently entered a sale-lease agreement with a 
successor corporation (Mountaineer) formed by a former employee for 
the purpose of taking over the business.160 The sales agreement pro-
vided that, until financing was attained to complete the sale, the for-
mer owner (Alkire) would receive the net profits from the business, as 
well as a weekly consulting fee. 161 After a coal strike that had caused 
the lay-off of most of Alkire's coal-hauling truckers ended, the "new" 
employer, Mountaineer, refused to rehire many of the former Alkire 
employees,162 resulting in section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) charges.163 
The Administrative Law Judge found that 
Alkire terminated his employees for a nondiscriminatory and lawful rea-
son; namely, because he was going out of business. An employer has an 
absolute right, under the Act, to go out of business regardless of the 
motivation. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 
380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).164 
The NLRB disagreed with the ALJ's characterization of the case 
as "involving, simply, an employer's right to go out ofbusiness."165 It 
found "that the Administrative Law Judge failed to analyze properly 
the complaint .... Central to [this action is] whether an alter ego 
relationship existed .... " 166 The Board proceeded to focus on the 
Crawford Door factors, rejecting the ALJ's finding that Alkire had 
gone out of business, and finding the existence of an alter ego relation-
158. The discussion in Part I.B supra addresses the Crawford Door factors in detail; there-
fore, the factors will not be reviewed in this Part. 
159. See text at note 157 supra. 
160. 716 F.2d at 1016. 
161. 716 F.2d at 1017. 
162. 716 F.2d at 1017. 
163. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (1982). The § 8(a)(3) discrimination charge rested upon 
Mountaineer's "requiring the employees to file new employment applications ... and by ... 
[denying or delaying the recall of] economic strikers ... who had made unconditional offers to 
return to work." Denzil S. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1323 (1982), enforcement denied, Alkire 
v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). For the text of§ 8(a)(3), see note 12 supra. For a 
discussion of the derivative nature of§ 8(a)(l), see note 11 supra. 
164. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1331 (statement of AU). 
165. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1325. 
166. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324. 
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ship. 167 The Fourth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the 
Board's decision, agreeing with the ALJ's Darlington analogy. Judge 
Gordon compared the competing policies of an employer's right to go 
out of business with the successor doctrine's pronouncement that 
[s]urrounding circumstances ... viewed in light of national labor policy, 
may "require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to 
rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be 
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in 
the employment relationship." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 
543, 549 (1964). 168 
The court concluded that the addition of a "reasonably foreseeable 
benefit" requirement set the proper bounds of these competing 
policies.169 
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit's test is viewed as objec-
tive or motive-based, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach 
has certain advantages over the other standards. For example, unlike 
the "critical" standard, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach 
comports more closely with the Supreme Court's description of the 
alter ego doctrine in Howard Johnson. Justice Marshall there de-
scribed the doctrine as applicable to transformations designed ''fre-
quently to avoid the effect of the labor laws."170 The "critical" 
standard will allow an employer to escape alter ego status unless intent 
to evade is shown; yet, Justice Marshall did not describe such transfor-
mations as being designed "always" to avoid the effect of the labor 
laws. Likewise, a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach is supe-
rior to the "relevant" standard because it provides a safeguard against 
Board overvaluation of animus in contravention of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Darlington. m 
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would al-
low an employer to escape alter ego status if the employer had a legiti-
mate business reason for making a change in corporate form that also 
resulted in a benefit related to eliminating labor obligations. Although 
the Alkire test's objective language appears to prevent exactly this situ-
167. 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324-26. 
168. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983) (parallel citations omitted). 
169. 716 F.2d at 1020. The court's stated rationale was this: 
Without some future benefit reasonably accruing from the employer's action, ..• the trans· 
fer of ownership is bona fide. If, however, the transfer, by eliminating an NLRA-imposed 
duty, provides a continuing benefit to the old employer, then the force of the closing survives 
the transfer. To the extent that obtaining the benefit was a motive for the transfer, or was a 
reasonably foreseeable effect, the result represents a disguised continuance of the old 
employer. 
716 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the competing policy considerations, see 
Part III infra. 
170. See text at note 76 supra. 
171. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 
417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974) (emphasis added); see also text at notes 149-55 supra. 
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ation, 172 Judge Gordon appears to let motive in through the back 
door, stating, "Linking employer motivation for the transfer of its 
business to obtaining a future benefit represents a broader standard 
than does requiring '[a]nti-union animus or intent to evade labor obli-
gations' .... " 173 The Sixth Circuit,174 scholarly commentary,175 and 
the Alkire dissent itself, 176 view this language as supporting the propo-
sition that motive is a relevant or even a critical consideration in the 
Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test. The Fourth 
Circuit recently reiterated this motive-based language in NLRB v. 
McAllister Bros. 177 
There are two possible approaches to reconciling the Fourth Cir-
cuit's apparently motive-based "foreseeable benefit" test with this 
Note's position that motive is not relevant. One approach is to ana-
lyze the circumstances in Alkire and McAllister, as well as the Darling-
ton analogy on which the court's test is based. Neither Alkire nor 
McAllister involved an employer that changed its corporate form for a 
legitimate business reason while casting off its labor obligations as a 
secondary consideration.178 No legitimate business reason validated 
Alkire's transformation; rather, the predecessor employer was found 
to have gone out of business while receiving no foreseeable benefit 
from the successor employer179 - a situation in which the Darlington 
analogy holds motive to be irrelevant. 
Likewise, McAllister did not involve an employer changing its cor-
porate form for a legitimate business reason. Judge Sprouse, speaking 
172. See text at note 157 supra. 
173. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983). 
174. See note 155 supra and accompanying text. 
175. See Befort, supra note 66, at 97 (The Fourth Circuit "recast[s] the alter ego test by 
requiring a finding of intent but in a purportedly more lenient form."). 
176. Judge Sprouse's dissenting opinion in Alkire focused on his disagreement with the ma-
jority over the role of motive: 
My principal disagreement ... is with the majority's conclusion that "employer motivation" 
is central to determining alter ego status. As the majority concedes, [Southport) does not 
require the NLRB to show that the employer intended to evade the purposes of the NLRA, 
in order to find alter ego status. Nor has such a requirement been imposed by the many 
courts which have discussed Board findings of alter ego status .... 
Employer motivation may be relevant to this inquiry, but it is certainly not, as the major-
ity apparently believes, determinative. 
716 F.2d at 1022 (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (citations omitted; emphasis added). He thus viewed 
the Fourth Circuit as adopting the "critical" standard. But see NLRB v. McAllister Bros., 819 
F.2d 439, 445 n.14 (4th Cir. 1987) (Judge Sprouse's majority opinion, although supposedly fol-
lowing the Alkire precedent, states: "imposition of alter-ego status under Alkire does not hinge 
on proof that the employer intended to evade the labor laws."). 
177. 819 F.2d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[T)he elimination of ... [the predecessor em-
ployer's) bargained-for employee commitments was the instrumental purpose motivating the 
transfer to ... [the successor employer]."). The court's language is softened by its footnote 
stating that intent is not always required, and also by the fact that the McAllister court found 
clear evidence of animus. 819 F.2d at 445 n.14. 
178. See notes 160-69 & 177 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text. 
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for a unanimous court, found that the predecessor employer's "elimi-
nation of . . . bargained-for employee commitments was the instru-
mental purpose motivating the transfer to [the successor 
employer]." 180 Judge Sprouse's statemen!J}:iM "imposition of alter-
ego status under Alkire does not hinge on proof that the employer 
intended to evade the labor laws,"181 while dicta, demonstrates that 
the court might be willing to find alter ego status in spite of a transfor-
mation motivated by a nonlabor-related reason. The language of the 
test itself - which uses the term "resulted in,"182 rather than "moti-
vated by," a reasonably foreseeable benefit - supports this 
interpretation. 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's Darlington analogy must be viewed in 
light of the Darlington case itself. Darlington Manufacturing Com-
pany owned and operated one textile mill. 183 A majority of its stock, 
however, was held by the Milliken family (headed by Roger Milliken), 
which controlled seventeen textile manufacturers and twenty-seven 
mills. 184 After the union won representation at Darlington in a bit-
terly contested election, Milliken decided to liquidate the company.18s 
The NLRB found that the closing was motivated by anti-union 
animus in violation of section 8(a)(3). 186 The Fourth Circuit, how-
ever, denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding an absolute 
right to close all or part of a business for any reason, including ani-
mus.187 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, agreed that an em-
ployer has the right to close all of its business for any reason; however, 
he did not agree with the Fourth Circuit's assertion that such a right 
exists for a partial closure, stating, "[A]n employer has the absolute 
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, but ... 
such right [does not] include[] the ability to close part of a business no 
matter what the reason."188 
Darlington should be viewed as a section 8(a)(3) discrimination 
case, in which motive is an important inquiry unless an employer 
closes the entire business. This principle is equally important in set-
ting the outer bounds of finding an alter ego relationship; however the 
180. McAllister, 819 F.2d at 445. 
181. 819 F.2d 445 n.14; see also note 176 supra. 
182. Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020; see also, text at note 157 supra. 
183. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 265 (1965). 
184. 380 U.S. at 265. 
185. 380 U.S. at 265·66. 
186. 380 U.S. at 267. 
187. 380 U.S. at 268. 
188. 380 U.S. at 268. The Court remanded Darlington to the Board to consider whether 
§ 8(a)(3) was violated: 
[A] partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to 
chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may 
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect. 
380 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added). 
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"discrimination" focus of section 8(a)(3), appropriate in Darlington, is 
not necessary in the typical alter ego case, which involves an objective 
section 8(a)(5) inquiry.189 
A second possible approach to reconciling the Fourth Circuit's ap-
parently motive-based stanaard and an objective standard is simply to 
accept that the court will consider motive in some degree.190 How-
ever, the analysis up to this point has shown the need for an objective 
inquiry, and the language of the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test 
supports such an inquiry. 191 This Note suggests rewording the Fourth 
Circuit's "foreseeable benefit" test as follows, in order to include the 
Crawford Door factors explicitly and to state the objective nature of 
the test: 
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether 
the old and new employer are the same employer in fact, given the 
Board's consideration of the following factors: substantially identical 
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, super-
vision, and ownership. If the employers are determined by the Board to 
be in reality the same employer, then the inquiry must turn to whether 
the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to 
the old employer related to the elimination of its labor obligations, re-
gardless of the motivation for the change in corporate form.192 
Policy considerations lend further support to this modified approach. 
Ill. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYEE 
EXPECTATIONS AND EMPLOYER FREEDOM 
Beyond Congress's broad mandate to "promote industrial peace 
and equality of bargaining power"193 by "removing certain recognized 
sources of industrial strife,"194 the NLRB" and the courts are given 
little legislative guidance. The task of reconciling "[t]he inherent ten-
sion between entrepreneurial prerogative and employee security"195 is 
thus left to the Board,196 withjudicial oversight.197 The policy consid-
erations discussed in this Part - protecting legitimate employee ex-
189. See notes 12 & 113-15 supra and accompanying text. 
190. The court clearly considers motive to be, at a minimum, "relevant." See text at notes 
173 & 176 supra. It is possible, however, to consider intent as relevant to proving whether the 
employer gained a foreseeable benefit, rather than viewing intent as an end in itself. The advan-
tage of the former approach over the latter is the guidance given to the NLRB on the purpose for 
which it is considering intent, rather than some vague notion about "relevance," and the various 
possible degrees that it can, or must, be considered. 
191. See text at note 157 supra. 
192. Cf. text at notes 53, 76 & 157 supra. 
193. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
194. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
195. Slicker, supra note 64, at 1051. 
196. See NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), supra note 30. 
197. See NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982), supra note 32. 
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pectations and delimiting employer freedom strengthen the 
argument for an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard. 
A. Protecting Legitimate Employee Expectations (Pigs Is Pigs19B) 
The fundamental proposition on which this Note is based ·is this: 
determining whether an old and a new employer are "in reality the 
same employer" should depend on the identity of the entity, not on its 
reason for becoming that entity.199 As Professor Roger Abrams has 
noted, 
[M]anagement can try to justify anything by citing economic necessity. 
[But] they can't get away from their legal responsibilities by changing 
the name over the door to something that looks like, sounds like, and 
smells like the old firm. Companies can't get rid of unions if employees 
want them, just as a union can't force itself on workers.200 
Preventing "industrial strife" through the protection of legitimate em-
ployee expectations can be achieved in two ways - ensuring fairness 
and avoiding the danger of pretext - both of which are advanced by 
an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test. 
It is fundamentally unfair if an employer can use a change in its 
corporate form - for any reason - to gain an unfair advantage over 
its employees.201 There is no difference, from an employee's point of 
view, whether the employer changed its form for labor or nonlabor-
related reasons. Thus, the equitable principle that substance should 
prevail over form,202 should be invoked in spite of the normal assump-
tions about limited corporate liability.203 The "critical," "relevant," 
198. This phrase is borrowed from E.P. BUTLER, PIGS Is PIGS (1906). The book has nothing 
to do with law, and little to do with anything else; however, the title cogently states this subpart's 
thesis. 
199. The definition of "alter ego" itself is objective in nature, focusing on a state of being 
rather than the reason for becoming that being: "[L, lit., second I]: a second self •... " WEB· 
SfER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (1981) (brackets in original). 
200. Engel, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting Professor Abrams based on an interview for the 
article) (brackets in original; emphasis added). 
201. See Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983). 
202. See, e.g., Dee Cee Floor Covering, 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 426 (1977) (statement of ALI) 
("The labor law is concerned with substance, not with form. Constantly changing corporate 
titles, or any other names, may serve a purpose under other laws, but they are meaningless 
insofar as the employees are concerned .... ") See also P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 70, at 181-
82; Slicker, supra note 64, at 1063-64. Cf. Denzil S. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1325 (1982), 
enforcement denied, 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1983). In Alkire, the NLRB claimed to review the 
"economic realities of the relationship." However, the Fourth Circuit declined to enforce the 
Board's order because "it made no findings concerning an economic benefit obtained or reason-
ably expected." 716 F.2d at 1021. 
203. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Alkire: 
This analysis for imposition of alter ego status is similar to the standard employed to pierce 
the corporate veil of a subsidiary corporation and hold its owner(s) liable for the debts of 
that subsidiary. In corporate law, as in the labor field, the alter ego doctrine is an equitable 
principle designed to prevent an entity from doing injury and then escaping responsibility by 
hiding behind a corporate shield. 
716 F.2d at 1021 n.5. 
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and motive-based "foreseeable benefit" tests all fail, from a fairness-to-
the-employee viewpoint, in cases where the employer's change is moti-
vated by nonlabor-related reasons, but the employer nonetheless 
changes the employee-employer relationship by rejecting its NLRA 
duties. 
The basic issue of fairness was used by Professor Befort as an argu-
ment for rejecting the "critical" standard in his discussion of Allcoast 
as a "double-breasting"204 case: 
The Allcoast case illustrates the basic unfairness of predicating alter 
ego status upon proof of an employer's evasive intent. . . . [T]he em-
ployer ... established a new firm performing the same work in the same 
market but without adherence to the labor agreement. Many, if not 
most, of the circuit courts nonetheless would not apply the labor agree-
ment to the new firm because of the alleged business justification for the 
firm's creation. Such a result ignores the legitimate contract expectations 
of the employees and the Board's traditional preference for contract en-
forcement. ... The employer's contractual responsibilities should ac-
company this benefit regardless of whether the new firm was created to 
avoid the union or merely to comply with Atlas' change in policy.205 
Allowing an employer to escape its obligations merely because its 
transformation was motivated by a legitimate reason not only defeats 
its employees' legitimate expectations, it also allows the employer to 
exceed its own expectations. As a signatory to the collective bargaining 
contract,206 the employer could not have expected to escape the terms 
of its contract. 
A second way of protecting legitimate employee ·expectations is by 
avoiding the danger of pretext. ·Except for the "critical" standard, all 
of the approaches discussed in Part II achieve this goal. 207 The danger 
of adopting intent as a prerequisite to alter ego status is the possible 
evasion by some employers of their collective bargaining obligations 
through a nonlabor-related pretext. As Judge Contie stated in 
Allcoast: 
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who 
desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the 
doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate 
business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the 
change to escape unwanted obligations.208 
204. See note 67 supra. 
205. Befort, supra note 66, at 99 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
206. The essence of alter ego status is a finding that the old and new employers are one and 
the same. See notes 70 & 76 supra and accompanying text. 
207. Unfortunately, all of the motive-based standards fail to achieve the other policy consid-
erations discussed in Part III. 
208. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 582 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit 
was not discussing a hypothetical problem in Al/coast; as the owner of Allcoast admitted to the 
AU, "I don't want it [the union], I'll be honest with you, who needs it, who wants it." 780 F.2d 
at 583 n.9 (brackets in original). See also 780 F.2d at 578 n.2 (owner originally changed location 
of "new" employer "to look good and play the game"). 
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Nor is Al/coast an isolated instance of an employer seizing upon a non-
labor-related motive to rid itself of unwanted labor obligations. For 
example, in NLRB v. Tricor Products, 209 the change in corporate form 
was "motivated by economics."210 However.,..the owner "candidly ad-
mitted his anti-union sentiment" and "seized on the opportunity to rid 
himself of the Union."211 Likewise, in The Bell Co., 212 the employer 
attempted to justify its corporate transformation on its "economic 
plight."213 The ALJ rejected the employer's argument, stating, "The 
assertion that [the employer] was suffering economic reversals and 
that its inability to make a profit was what prompted the discharge 
was mere pretext."214 
Even though the noncritical, motive-based standards are flexible 
enough to prevent an employer from escaping its labor obligations 
through a pretext, they are nonetheless transcended by an objective 
"reasonably foreseeable benefit" test. Under an objective standard, an 
employer cannot escape its labor obligations regardless of the motiva-
tion; thus, the Board is not left the difficult task of differentiating legit-
imate and pretextual reasons. This better preserves the legitimate 
expectations of employees. While this subpart has focused on em-
ployee expectations, a discussion of policy arguments would not be 
complete without considering the proper boundaries of employer free-
dom, the next subject of this Note. 
B. Delimiting Employer Freedom: The Supreme Court 
Cases Revisited 
One labor-relations attorney has asserted, " 'Shifting assets and re• 
sponding to competitive pressures should remain a management pre-
rogative.' He argues that 'labor may be creating a problem where 
none exists.' "215 However, in NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 216 Judge 
Sloviter stated that the alter ego doctrine 
represents a departure from the generally accepted principle that an em-
ployer's freedom to contract includes the right to transfer assets, reor-
ganize its business or close a portion thereof without imposing on its 
vendee the obligation to adopt its labor contract. NLRB v. Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282-84 (1972); Textile 
209. 636 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980). 
210. 636 F.2d at 271. 
211. 636 F.2d at 271. 
212. 225 N.L.R.B. 474 (1976) (statement of AU), enforcement denied on other grounds, 
NLRB v. Bell Co., 561 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1977). 
213. 225 N.L.R.B. at 478 (statement of AU). 
214. 225 N.L.R.B. at 482 (statement of AU). See also NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886, 888 
(9th Cir. 1957), ajfd., 357 U.S. 10 (1958) (employer used what had initially been a legitimate 
change in its business arrangement to "shake the union"). 
215. Engel, supra note 7, at 19 (quoting Arthur Rosenfeld, labor-relations attorney with the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, based on an interview for the article). 
216. 612 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 
(1965).217 
Although Judge Sloviter's position on the role of motive is diametri-
cally opposed to the thesi$iOf this Note,218 her citation of Darlington 
and the successorship cases provides the appropriate framework in 
which to analyze the proper bounds of employer freedom vis-a-vis em-
ployee expectations. A review of these cases demonstrates that an ob-
jective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test properly delimits 
employer freedom. 
The Supreme Court has decided three successorship cases in which 
the NLRB was faced with "reconcil[ing] the tension between the col-
lective bargaining rights of the employees and the employer's right to 
make use of his property as he sees fit. " 219 One of the Court's observa-
tions in the first of those cases, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 220 is 
equally applicable to alter ego policy considerations. Justice Harlan, 
speaking for the Court, stated: 
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles 
of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners indepen-
dently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as em-
ployers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden 
change in the employment relationship.221 
The Court provided employees with a fair amount of protection in 
Wiley. The case involved a bona fide merger between two publishing 
companies (Interscience was merged into Wiley).222 Interscience's 
union sued under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act223 to compel arbitration of disputes arising under Interscience's 
collective bargaining contract. The Court agreed with the union, 
based on the "impressive policy considerations favoring arbitra-
217. 612 F.2d at 783 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). In Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374 
(statement of AU), enforced, NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986), the 
predecessor and successor employers went so far as to assert that the alter ego doctrine repre-
sented "a deprivation of their Federal constitutional right to do business as they please." 271 
N.L.R.B. at 1375. The ALJ rejected this constitutional argument, stating: 
Since [the alter ego and single employer] doctrines are an integral part of the enforcement of 
the Act, the Respondents are necessarily arguing that the Act is unconstitutional .... The 
essence of Harris' argument is that the Act is invalid because it unconstitutionally prevents 
him from doing what he want [sic] to do. I know of no such constitutional right. 
The constitutional attack leveled herein on the National Labor Relations Act ... comes 
late in the day. 
271 N.L.R.B. at 1379 (citations & footnotes omitted). The ALJ's ruling on the constitutional 
issue was not appealed. Al/coast is apparently the only attempt to make such a constitutional 
argument. 
218. See 612 F.2d at 789 ("[N]o policy reason has been advanced by the majority in support 
of the extension of [the alter ego] doctrine to a situation where no evidence of any antiunion 
animus appears on the record."). 
219. Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 625. 
220. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
221. 376 U.S. at 549. 
222. 376 U.S. at 544-45. 
223. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); see note 74 supra. 
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tion,"224 and the "substantial continuity of identity in the business 
enterprise. "225 
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 226 however, the 
Court declined to extend the broad protection of its arbitration princi-
ple to the unfair-labor-practice context. In Burns, the successor em-
ployer hired a majority of the predecessor's work force in an arms-
length transaction.227 After ruling that in such a case the successor 
may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union, Justice White, 
speaking for the Court, stated, "It does not follow, however, from 
Burns' duty to bargain that it was bound to observe the substantive 
terms of the collective-bargaining contract .... "22s 
Justice White's refusal to bind an arms-length successor was based 
on policy considerations wholly inapposite to the alter ego context. 
He noted, "A potential employer niay be willing to take over a mori-
bund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure 
[and] composition of the labor force .... "229 In an alter ego case, the 
successor employer is the predecessor employer, regardless of the rea-
son for the change in corporate form. This is not a case of "having 
contract provisions imposed upon them against their wi11";230 rather, 
the alter ego employer is a signatory to the collective bargaining con-
tract, achieving the Burns Court's desire that "the balance of bargain-
ing advantage ... be set by economic power realities."231 • 
Naturally, there must be some way of distinguishing an alter ego 
case, involving "in reality the same employer," and an arms-length 
successorship case. The line between the two doctrines is drawn by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington 
Manufacturing Co., 232 which held that "an employer has the absolute 
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases."233 If 
224. 376 U.S. at 550. ' 
225. 376 U.S. at 551. 
226. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
227. 406 U.S. at 275. 
228. 406 U.S. at 281-82. 
229. 406 U.S. at 287-88. 
230. 406 U.S. at 287. 
231. 406 U.S. at 288. Ultimately, the issue returns to that of legitimate employee expecta-
tions. This is apparent in Justice Marshall's opinion in the most recent successorship case -
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). He refers to an 
alter ego transaction as "a paper transaction without meaningful impact on the ownership or 
operation of the enterprise," specifically noting "that Howard Johnson [did not have] any previ-
ous dealings with the Union, [nor had it] participated in any way in negotiating or approving the 
collective-bargaining agreements." 417 U.S. at 259 n.5. In stark contrast, an alter ego employer 
has both negotiated and approved the contract. To borrow from the Supreme Court's language in 
the super-seniority and "lockout" cases, allowing the employer to escape its contractual obliga-
tions ignores "the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself." 373 
U.S. at 228. For the complete quote, see note 122 supra. 
232. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
233. 380 U.S. at 268. See text at note 188 supra. 
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business operations have actually ceased, there will be no foreseeable 
benefit to the predecessor employer.234 It is at this point that the 
Burns Court's concerns about inhibiting a bona fide new employer 
from taking over a "motj.9und business" and bargaining according to 
"economic power realities" are appropriate. Darlington thus describes 
an employer's right to go out of business for any reason, and the fore-
seeable benefit test indicates at what point the employer in fact has 
gone out of business. In the final analysis, the Board's inquiry into 
whether there was an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" to the 
old employer constitutes a safeguard - verifying that the Crawford 
Door factors were properly applied in determining alter ego status. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most serious criticisms of the alter ego doctrine has 
been that "[t]he many cases in this area demonstrate that alter ego 
determinations - critical in many management rights contexts - are 
apt to differ unpredictably frOJil case to case, depending not only upon 
controlling facts but also on the predication of the adjudicating 
body."235 Thus, the very flexibility that the Sixth Circuit views as a 
strength in arguing for the "relevant" standard236 can also be viewed 
as a weakness. 237 
An objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides the 
NLRB with flexibility by retaining discretion to weigh the seven Craw-
ford Door factors. This captures the benefits of the flexible approach 
espoused by those supporting the "relevant standard." It also avoids 
the pitfalls of the "critical" standard, which cannot be supported on 
the language of Southport, on an interpretation of the standard as a 
234. This statement should be interpreted as meaning "business operations have ceased in a 
particular line of business." For example, an employer in the textile business may decide to cease 
textile operations and to redeploy its capital in, e.g., computer technology or agriculture. In such 
a case, the Board should not find any foreseeable benefit related to the elimination of the em-
ployer's labor obligations - the employee bargaining unit no longer reflects the same "commu-
nity of interests." See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), quoted at note 4 supra. See 
generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 282-83 (discussing criteria for deter-
mining an appropriate bargaining unit). If the NLRB has properly applied the Crawford Door 
and foreseeable-benefit criteria, the characteristics of the appropriate bargaining unit should be 
unchanged, since the same employer in fact will be in the same line of business. See Part I.B 
supra. (It should be noted that the NLRA does not apply at all in the field of agriculture. See 
note 2 supra.). 
235. P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 70, at 183 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, Double-
Breasted Operations, supra note 67, at 48 ("[I]n an area where concrete standards, applied with 
uniformity, are crucial to unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable."). 
236. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986). 
237. As one commentator has noted in the successorship context: 
[T]he Court reaffirmed the existing policy of ad hoc evolution of general criteria . . . . 
Therein lies Burns' greatest wisdom and, perhaps, its most telling weakness, for it permits 
the widest possible flexibility in the face of constantly changing factual patterns, but at the 
same time it diminishes predictability in an area of the law where predictable consequences 
are exceedingly desirable. 
Slicker, supra note 64, at 1104. 
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variation on the "relevant" theme, by analogy to the "runaway shop'' 
cases, or on policy grounds. 
Yet, at the same time, the objective "reasonably foreseeable bene-
fir standard maintains predictability and uniformity by articulating 
an approach that safeguards an employer's absolute right to go out of 
business for any reason, including animus. This conforms with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Darlington. Employer motive is thus 
viewed as a means to an end in determining whether the old employer 
anticipated a foreseeable benefit, rather than as an end in itself. Fi-
nally, the language 'of the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable 
benefit" test, which in its own right is capable of supporting an objec-
tive interpretation, is strengthened by the explicit rejection of "legiti-
mate business reasons" as a ground for avoiding alter ego status -
providing an additional safeguard for the protection of legitimate em-
ployee expectations. The National Labor Relations Act's goal of pro-
moting industrial peace - not to mention a basic sense of fairness -
demands no less. 
- Gary Alan MacDonald 
